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Although theory predicts that international trade will decrease the relative demand for skilled 
workers in relatively skill-deficit countries, in recent decades many developing countries have 
experienced rising wage premiums for skilled workers. We examines this puzzle by 
quantifying the relative importance of different supply and demand factors in explaining the 
rapid increase in the returns to education experienced by China during the 1990s. Analyzing 
Chinese urban household survey and census data for six provinces, we find that although 
changes in the structure of demand did reduce the demand for skilled workers, consistent 
with trade theory, the magnitude of the effect was modest and more than offset by 
institutional reforms and technological changes that increased the relative demand for skill. 
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1. Introduction 
An intriguing question in international economics is why globalization in recent 
decades is associated with widening skill premiums in both developed and developing 
countries (see Wood 1997, Harrison and Hanson 1999, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007 for 
surveys of the literature). Standard trade theory predicts that with greater trade and 
specialization, the relative demand for skilled workers should increase in developed 
countries where skilled workers are relatively abundant and decrease in developing 
countries where skilled workers are relatively scarce. The direction of skill premium 
changes thus is expected to diverge in rich and poor countries. Foreign direct investment 
is another key aspect of globalization which could increase the demand for skilled 
workers in poor countries if FDI embodies skill-biased technologies developed in rich 
countries (Acemoglu 2002). There may also be other confounding factors that help 
explain the puzzle since many supply and demand factors may be changing over time, 
complicating simple before-after comparisons. 
So far the evidence on the effect of globalization on inequality in developing 
countries comes mainly from Latin America and India (see review by Goldberg and 
Pavcnik 2007). Little research has been done on China, with the exceptions of Wei and 
Wu (2002) and Wan, Lu and Chen (2007).
1 Being the largest trading nation and most 
populous country in the developing world, analyzing China’s experience can increase 
understanding of how globalization affects world inequality and influences skill 
premiums in developing countries. Many studies of rising wage inequality in the United 
States and other industrial countries since the 1980s have found skill-biased technical 
change to be the most important contributing factor.
2 
                                                        
1  Evidence from Hong Kong shows a large increase in the relative demand for skilled workers following 
China's FDI liberalization in the late 1970’s (Hsieh and Woo 2005, Ho, Wei and Wong 2005). 
2  Among many studies, notable contributions include Katz and Murphy (1992), Bound and Johnson 
(1992), Juhn et al. (1993), Krueger (1993), Freeman (1993), Freeman and Katz (1994), Borjas and Valerie 
(1995), DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998), Acemoglu (2002), Card and   2
 Wage inequality in urban China expanded rapidly in the 1990s, with rising returns 
to education playing an important role (Park et al., 2008). Based on repeated 
cross-sectional data between 1988 and 2001 drawn from urban household surveys in 6 
provinces, Zhang et al. (2005) find that the returns to a year of schooling increased from 
only 4.0 percent in 1988 to 10.2 percent in 2001. Most of the rise in the returns to 
education occurred after 1992 and reflected an increase in the wage premium for higher 
education. The higher returns to education are observed within groups defined by sex, 
work experience, region, and ownership.   
Many factors can influence the returns to education. In addition to international 
trade and skill-biased technological progress, which are general processes, in China 
specific features of the country’s economic transition may also have played an important 
role. First, China witnessed a massive inflow of unskilled migrant labor from rural to 
urban areas which may have reduced the relative skill level of the urban labor force even 
as educational attainment of the total population improved.
3 Second, during the central 
planning and early reform periods, wage-setting in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
compressed the wage structure; later institutional reforms that decentralized wage-setting 
authority to individual enterprises led wages to become more market-determined over 
time, increasingly rewarding productivity. Third, the role of markets in determining 
wages was reinforced by increased competition associated with the free entry and rapid 
growth of the non-state sector. 
Existing empirical studies that examine the relationship between globalization and 
inequality in China (Wei and Wu 2002, Wan, Lu and Chen 2007) examine whether 
regions that were more exposed to trade liberalization experienced different changes in 
income inequality than less-exposed regions without systematically accounting for other 
                                                                                                                                                               
DiNardo, 2002, and Lemieux (2007). 
3  A large literature examines rural-to-urban labor migration in China (examples are Zhao 1999a, 1999b, 
Rozelle et al., 1999.)   3
factors. The results are conflicting: while Wei and Wu (2002) find a negative relationship, 
Wan, Lu and Chen (2007) find a positive effect. 
Given the multiple possible explanations for rising returns to education in China, we 
adopt a unified framework to systematically evaluate the relative contributions of 
different demand and supply factors to changes in education premiums. We divide the 
factors into four groups: (1) institutional changes affecting sectoral wage rents; (2) 
changes in the relative supply of skilled labor in urban labor markets, including 
rural-urban migrants; (3) changes in labor demand associated with shifts in production 
structure due to greater specialization based on comparative advantage or to other 
product demand shifts; and (4) technological change, which is likely to be influenced by 
FDI. We focus on the wage differentials among workers with college education and 
above, senior high school education and junior high school education and below.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background for understanding China’s evolving labor market, Section 3 describes the 
data sources and presents the changes in wage differentials among educational groups 
during the 1990s. Section 4 presents the analytical framework, Section 5 reports the 
empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background: China’s Economic Reforms in the 1990s 
Prior to the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, China had a 
highly compressed wage structure determined by the government’s centralized economic 
planning apparatus. Since that time, and especially since the 1990s, wage setting has 
become increasingly market driven, leading to significant increases in wage inequality. 
Two main reforms that have contributed to this outcome are the deregulation of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and free entry and competition from the non-state 
sector, including foreign-invested enterprises.   4
The reform of the SOEs prior to the mid-1990s were incremental and focused on 
strengthening managerial incentives by allowing managers more autonomy, including a 
certain degree of freedom in employment and wage setting. Nonetheless, government 
pay scales still largely defined differences in compensation based on pay rank, occupation, 
region, and type of workplace. Leaders refrained from privatizing enterprises and 
prohibited managers from firing workers. However, things changed quite dramatically 
starting in the mid-1990s, when the Chinese government moved ahead aggressively to 
diversify ownership of SOEs and allow inefficient firms to reduce employment or go 
bankrupt. Aggressive economic restructuring led to the layoffs of at least 10 million 
workers by 1997 and 27 million workers from 1998 to 2004, mostly from the state sector 
(Cai, Park and Zhao 2008). These changes profoundly affected the functioning of the 
labor market in China. 
  The ownership conversion of SOEs in the 1990s was a government response to 
massive financial losses in the state sector, which in turn, were partly induced by the 
emergence of non-state enterprises as competitors. The first powerful burst of non-state 
enterprise growth came from collectively-owned rural enterprises freed by the 
de-collectivization of agriculture in the early- to mid-1980s. In addition, foreign direct 
investment from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan was targeted by the establishment of 
special economic zones in southeast coastal areas. The openness policy greatly expanded 
in the early 1990s, leading to a sharp rises in foreign direct investments not just from 
Greater China but from around the world. With no responsibilities to provide “iron-rice 
bowls” to workers, these new entrants offered competitive wages to attract workers, 
helping to loosen the previously compressed wage structure. Following the labor market 
retrenchment in the mid-1990s, many urban workers of all skill levels were forced to seek 
employment outside of the state sector. Competition from rapidly growing non-state 
firms eliminated monopoly rents in most sectors, and wage rents previously created by   5
incremental reforms diminished, resulting in redistribution of wage rents across sectors. 
Recent reforms of the state sector have created new mixed ownership forms, 
including cooperative units, joint ownership units, limited liability corporations, and 
shareholding corporations. Although these new ownership forms maintain some 
state-ownership, they provide firm managers with greater profit incentives and autonomy, 
especially in the area of employment and wage-setting. Until the beginning of the 1990s, 
the pure state sector, including government and fully-owned state enterprises, accounted 
for over 80 percent of urban employment. By 2005, its employment share was less than 
40 percent.   
The greatest source of labor supply for non-state enterprises has been rural migrant 
workers. As a legacy of the economic planning era, all Chinese citizens are registered 
either as agricultural or non-agricultural residents in a specific location (hukou). 
Agricultural residents used to be confined to farming; moving to urban areas required 
government approval which was quite difficult. Over time, despite the persistence of the 
residential registration system, many practical barriers to population mobility disappeared 
(e.g., difficulty of government approvals, fees, quotas), enabling many rural residents to 
work in cities, where there was high demand for their services. If we define a migrant as 
someone residing in a county or city different from his/her home of registration, 
migrants comprised 5.8 percent of China’s total population, 12.2 percent of the urban 
population, and 2.5 percent of the rural population in 2000. In China’s cities (excluding 
townships), migrants accounted for 14.6 percent of the population and 19.6 percent of 
employment (Cai, Park and Zhao 2008).   
  Because rural residents have significantly fewer years of formal schooling than their 
urban counterparts due to longstanding inequities in educational access in rural and 
urban areas, most rural migrants are relatively unskilled, with no more than a junior high 
school education.  Thus, the inflow of rural migrants increased the relative supply of   6
unskilled workers in cities. It should be noted that despite the large flow of labor from 
rural to urban areas, substantial income differentials remains between urban and rural 
areas even after controlling for individual differences in gender, age, and education. 
Despite recent reforms intended to better integrate migrants into urban communities, 
most migrants still lack equal treatment.  They are unable to send their children to 
urban schools unless they pay high additional fees, and they lack access to housing, social 
insurance, and social protection programs afforded to registered nonagricultural 
residents. 
  With respect to external economic relations, the 1990s was the decade in which the 
Chinese economy became highly integrated with the global economy. Steps to liberalize 
international trade and attract FDI were made well in advance of China’s entry into the 
WTO in 2000. The number of companies authorized to conduct trade transactions 
increased from less than 5000 in 1988 to more than 30,000 in 2000, and average statutory 
tariff rates fell by nearly two thirds to about 15 percent in 2000 (Lardy, 2002). New 
regulations on FDI established in 1986 set the stage for a rapid growth in FDI in the 
next decade. The results were breathtaking. Exports quadrupled from 1990 to 2000, 
while newly contracted FDI increased by more than 10 times, from just $660 million in 
1990 to nearly $7 billion in 2000 (peaking at over $10 billion in 1993).    By 2000, China’s 
total trade was equal to more than 40 percent of GDP.    FDI accounted for as much as 
17 percent of national capital formation in 1994, declining to 7 percent by 2004 
(Branstetter and Lardy, 2008).   
 
3. Data and Descriptive Evidence of Rising Returns to Education in China 
We use wage data from China’s Urban Household Surveys (UHS) collected by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) from 1989 to 2001 in six provinces: Beijing, 
Guangdong, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Zhejiang. This is a period during which   7
China experienced very rapid growth in international trade and foreign direct investment. 
The six provinces are roughly representative of China’s different regions.  Beijing is in 
North-Central China, Guangdong and Zhejiang are coastal provinces, Liaoning is in the 
Northeast, Shaanxi is in the Northwest, and Sichuan is in the Southwest. Table 1 reports 
sample sizes for each year after excluding students, the disabled, and those younger than 
16 or older than 60. To reduce bias caused by variations in working hours, when 
computing wages by educational levels we confine our sample to full-time employees, 
excluding individuals who are self-employed or re-employed retired workers, who 
together account for less than 15 percent of the labor force in 2001 (Table 1). The size 
of the resulting sample is 6,000-8,000 individuals in each year (Table 1). The NBS 
household sample surveys are provincially representative. In all calculations, we employ 
sampling weights to account for changes in sampling rates in different provinces over 
time.
4 
The wage measure is the annual wage, including base wages, bonuses, and subsidies. 
The UHS data does not include information on working hours, making it impossible to 
calculate an hourly wage. It also does not provide data on the value of non-wage benefits 
such as pensions, health insurance, and unemployment insurance, which are likely to be 
greater for the better educated (leading to underestimation of the true returns to 
education) and for those working in the state sector. All wages are in 1988 yuan, deflated 
using provincial CPIs. One limitation of the UHS data is that it does not sample migrant 
households living in urban areas without a local household registration (hukou). Because 
migrant workers account for an increasingly large share of the workforce, especially of 
low-skill workers, the UHS samples become less representative over time.   
Because of the weaknesses of the UHS data, throughout the paper we focus on the 
years 1990, 1995 and 2000, for which we have more complete employment data from 
                                                        
4  The provincial sampling weights are proportional to the non-agricultural population divided by UHS 
sample size in each province.   8
China’s 1990 and 2000 population censuses and 1995 mini-census of one percent of the 
population.
5 Unfortunately, the census data do not include information on wages. The 
year 1995 roughly coincides with the end of the first spurt in rapidly rising returns to 
education (Park et al. 2008). For each year of data, we also include the adjacent two years 
of data in order to increase sample size and smooth out short-run fluctuations. Except 
where explicitly noted, in the analysis below employment numbers are from the census 
and mini-census data, while wages are from the UHS data. In combining these data, we 
implicitly assume that migrant labor and local resident labor are perfectly substitutable.  
In fact, migrant workers often face discrimination, earning lower wages than local 
workers (Meng and Zhang 2001).  Since migrants tend to be less educated, the lack of 
wage data for migrants thus is likely to lead to downward bias in the estimated returns to 
education. 
To carry out the supply and demand analysis, the total labor force as measured by 
the census and mini-census data must be disaggregated into a discrete number of 
educational groups. We classify education levels into three groups: “college” refers to 
college-educated and above, including three- or two-year vocational colleges and 
post-graduate education, “senior high” includes graduates of senior high school and 
three- or two-year vocational and technical high schools, and “junior high” includes those 
completing junior high school and below.
6 One concern about these categories is that 
                                                        
5  Table A1 in appendix compares descriptive statistics for the UHS sample and the census data. The UHS 
sample from the six provinces tend to be older, female, and more educated, compared to the census 
samples in the same provinces and in the whole country. But the changes in age, sex, education 
composition and employment distribution across industries show similar pattern between the UHS and 
census samples.   
6  The issues arising in disaggregating the labor force have been discussed by Hamermesh (1993) and Katz 
and Autor (1999). One simple approach is to break up the work force into two groups of particular interest, 
such as “high” and “low” education (equivalents), or "young" and "old", or men and women. This 
approach was used by Katz and Murphy (1992), Baldwin and Cain (1997), and Autor et al. (1998), etc. The 
advantage of this approach is it is simple to implement and the estimates are easy to interpret, but much 
information is lost. Another approach is to divide the labor force into a large number of cells, typically by 
sex, education, age/experience groups. The advantage of this approach is that it uses much more 
information on the nature of changes in wage structure; however it requires strong assumptions about 
functional form and substitutability of different groups. Bound and Johnson (1992) adopt the latter 
approach to classify the labor force into 32 groups defined by gender, experience and educational level.     9
they aggregate different subcategories of educational attainment, so that changes in 
group composition could bias estimates of changes in the returns to education.  In 
Appendix Table A2, we present tabulations of how the composition of each education 
group changes over time.  For the UHS data used to calculate the wage differentials 
(columns 1-3), the “quality” of junior high and below clearly increases, the composition 
of senior high school changes little, and the “quality” of college and above falls, as 2- 
and 3-year colleges become more prevalent.  This suggests that our estimates of 
increasing wage differentials over time are likely to be downward biased.   
Table 2 presents mean log wages by educational level. The wages of all three 
educational levels increased over the period, with the college-educated gaining the most, 
followed by senior high school graduates; those with junior high school education and 
below gained the least. To control for other factors influencing wages, we run regressions 
of wages on education levels and other personal characteristics (including dummy 
variables for sex, four potential experience groups, six provinces, and dummy variables 
for the two adjacent years). The resultant wage differentials by educational level in 
different years and their changes from 1990 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2000 are reported 
in Table 3.   
As can be seen from Table 3, the wage differentials between college education and 
senior high school education and between senior high school education and junior high 
school education both experienced dramatic increases in the 1990s. However, there were 
some notable differences between 1990-95 and 1995-2000 and with respect to the levels 
of education being compared. First, the wage differential widened faster between senior 
high school and junior high than between college and senior high school in both periods. 
Secondly, wage differentials widened faster from 1995 to 2000 than from 1990 to 1995. 
The wage differential between senior high school and junior high school graduates was 
only 14.9% in 1990, increasing to 22.9% in 1995 and rising rapidly to 34.7% in 2000. In   10
comparison, the wage differential between college and senior high school graduates 
started at a slightly higher level of 17.7% in 1990, and increased to 25.2% in 1995 and 
35.6% in 2000. The goal of this paper is to explain these patterns and trends. 
 
4. Conceptual Framework 
The aggregate labor force is composed of I educational groups employed in S 
sectors of employment defined by industry and ownership categories. As in Bound and 
Johnson (1992), Wis is the wage of education group i (i=college, senior high, or junior 
high) in sector s, and is the product of a competitive wage Wic for each education group 
and a relative wage rent Ris for working in sector s:  
  is ic is R W W      ( 1 )                 
If the non-pecuniary attributes of employment in all sectors are identical and nothing 
causes wages to deviate from their competitive norm, the wage rents (Ris’s) will all be 
identically equal to one. However, in general wage differentials do exist across sectors 
(Krueger and Summers, 1988; Healwege, 1992; Zhao, 2002). Taking the logarithm of 
both sides of equation (1) and denoting logs with lower case letters, the log wage of 
group i in sector s can be decomposed into two additive parts:   
  is ic is r w w   . (1’) 
Averaging both sides of equation (1’) across all sectors, we get: 
      
s
is is ic i ic i r w r w w   (2) 
where wi is the average log wage of group i and   
s
is is i r r    is the wage rent enjoyed by 
group i, where  is    is the employment share of group i in sector s ( is  =Nis/Ni where Nis 
is the number of workers in demographic group i in sector s and Ni is the total number 
of workers in group i).    11
Totally differentiating equation (2), we get the following:   
  i ic i dr dw dw    (3) 
Thus, any change in wage differentials between educational groups is caused either by 
changes in wage rents or by changes in competitive wages. The change in wage rent can 
be written as follows:   




is is is is
s
is is i d r dr d r dr dr     ) ( . 
This decomposition has two elements: changes in relative wages of economic sectors, 

s
is isdr  , or “wage effects”, and changes in the distribution of employment across 
economic sectors,  
s
is isd r  , or “weight effects”. 
Assuming that the wage rent in sector s is identical for each educational group 
( s is r r  ), we consider the two dimensions of industry and ownership type. Thus, we can 
decompose the wage rent into industrial wage rents and ownership wage rents as 
follows:
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Here, subscript j indexes industry and subscript o indexes ownership type;  jo r  is the 
wage rent rate for industry j and ownership type o,  j r  is the average wage rent in 
industry j,  ijo   is the fraction of group i in industry j and ownership type o,  ij   is the 
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7 This assumption implies that wage rents are only related to characteristics of sector s and not workers’ 
education levels, in other words that they do not reflect selection effects.     12









 is the average industry wage rent enjoyed by group i. 
Assuming that the industrial wage rent rate  j r and ownership wage rent rate  o r  
are determined independently, namely that  o j jo r r r   , then the ownership wage rent 
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Totally differentiating this equation yields the following expression: 
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i i d r dr d r dr dr dr dr      (4) 
Using equation (4), we can separately calculate changes in industrial wage rents 
J
i dr and 
changes in ownership wage rents 
O
i dr , and each of these can be further decomposed 
into a wage effect and weight effect. 
Following Bound and Johnson (1992), we can use the following expression derived 
from a fully specified demand and supply system to decompose the change in 
competitive wages for group i: 
  ) (ln ) / 1 ( ) (ln ) / 1 ( ) (ln ) / 1 1 ( i i i ic N d D d b d dw        ,   (5) 
where dwic is the change in the competitive wage of group i, dlnNi is the change in relative 
supply of workers in group i, dlnDi is the change in relative demand for workers in group 
i due to shifts in product demand across industries, dln(bi) is the change in relative general 
technical efficiency of group i, and    is the constant elasticity of substitution among 
educational groups (which can range from 0 to positive infinity). 
Equation (5) states that changes in the relative competitive wage of group i workers   13
depend positively on the change in relative technical efficiency d(lnbi), negatively on the 
relative supply change d(lnNi), and positively on the change in the demand for products 
that use group i workers more intensively in their production d(lnDi). The impact of each 
factor on wages depends upon the elasticity of intrafactor substitution. 
Plugging equations (4) and (5) into equation (3), we present the final equation for 
decomposing changes in the relative wage of each educational group: 




i dr dr    (6) 
This equation states that a change in the wages of group i relative to the mean wage or 
the wage of another educational group can be decomposed into four sources: changes in 
wage rents, changes in relative labor supply, changes in relative labor demand due to 
shifts in product demand, and changes in relative technological efficiency.   
 
5. Results 
5.1. Wage Rents 
We can use a discrete form of equation (4) to calculate changes in wage rents over 
time. As noted above, these changes include changes in relative wage levels across 
industries or ownership types, i.e., wage effects, and changes in the educational 
composition of employment in high- and low-wage industries and ownership types, i.e., 
weight effects. The share of group i in industry j or in ownership type o in each year can 
be computed directly from the data, but we need to estimate the wage rents. Assuming 
that the industrial and ownership wage rents are determined independently, we can use 
the following regression to estimate the wage rents of group i in industry j or ownership 











ki i k T P S S G W                    0 ln  (7) 
Here, lnWk is the log real wage of individual k,  Gki are a set of dummy variables   14
capturing individual characteristics i, e.g., sex, experience, and education, Skj are dummy 
variables for industries j, Sko are dummy variables for ownership types o, Pkp are dummy 
variables for provinces p, Tt are dummy variables for years t,
8 and  k is the error term. 
The estimated coefficients on the dummies for industries ( j  ), capture the industrial 
wage premium relative to the reference group, and the deviation of the estimated  j  ’s 
from their mean value   in each period is the wage rent associated with industry j 
(     j j r ).
9    Ownership wage rents are calculated in analogous fashion. 
Categorization of industries in the NBS urban household survey varies in different 
years. We aggregate the industries into 10 categories that can be consistently defined over 
all years. Estimated wage rents for industrial sectors are reported in columns 1 to 3 of 
Table 4. Not surprisingly, monopoly industries such as finance and insurance, 
transportation, and postal and telecommunications services consistently enjoyed above 
average wage rents while decentralized and competitive industries such as manufacturing, 
retail trade and food catering had below-average wages. The data also confirm anecdotal 
observations that government agencies and semi-governmental social service sectors 
(education; research; culture, mass media, and health care; and sports and social welfare) 
have enjoyed considerable gains in wages over time. 
The distributions of employment by educational group among industries are 
reported in columns 4 to 12 of Table 4.
10 It is easy to see that workers with less 
education tend to work in low-wage industries. Nearly half of all workers with junior 
high school education or below were in manufacturing, and another 19 percent worked in 
the retail and catering industry. Over time, these workers increasingly worked in the social 
                                                        
8  To smooth out time effects, we define years as moving averages, for example, data for year 1990 includes 
1989, 1990 and 1991. 






j j j   , 
where J=10 is the total number of industrial categories;  0    of the base industry is set to zero.   
10  In estimating wage rents, we use employment numbers calculated from the UHS data from which the 
wage data are taken. The census data does not provide information on ownership type.     15
service industry, reaching 10 percent in 2000. Although these three industries also 
absorbed a large share of senior high school graduates, the percentages were relatively 
lower. Senior high school graduates increasingly entered into high-paying sectors such as 
post and telecom services, finance and insurance, and government or semi-government 
agencies. For college graduates, although nearly one quarter were employed in 
manufacturing, nearly 40 percent worked in educational institutions and government or 
semi-governmental agencies that enjoyed relatively high wage rents. 
It is not obvious at first sight whether high-wage industries expanded or 
contracted, or whether workers with less education left or entered low-wage industries 
with increasing frequency over time. In columns 2 to 4 of Table 5, we calculate the total 
effects of changes in industrial wage rents on wage differentials by educational groups 
and decompose the effects into wage and weight effects. 
The total effect of changes in relative industrial wage rents is to increase the 
returns to education. In both periods and for both college versus high school graduates 
and high school versus junior high school, wage effects dominate weight effects. 
Inspecting the results more carefully yields some interesting observations. From 1990 to 
1995, the effect of changes in industry wage rents was similarly positive for the 
college-senior high and senior-junior high wage differentials while weight effects were 
inconsequential.  However, from 1995 to 2000, changes in industry wage rents strongly 
favored the college-educated, and this was caused mainly by intensified selection of the 
college-educated into high-wage industries, or weight effects. This change in inequality 
dynamics in the latter period could reflect the fact that college graduates increasingly 
looked for jobs on their own instead of relying on government assignment. It could also 
reflect the increasing prevalence of “jumping into the sea,” whereby those working in the 
government and state sectors left for more lucrative jobs in the financial or private 
sectors.   16
An important part of the economic transition in China has been liberalization of 
wage setting in the state sector, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as 
government and semi-government institutions. It is thus of interest to examine whether 
state sector rents existed independently of industry rents and how changes in such rents 
influenced wage differentials across educational groups. The estimated  o r ’s are reported 
in columns 1 to 3 in Panel B of Table 4. The employment distribution of the three 
educational groups across ownership types are described in columns 4 to 12. It is 
immediately obvious that the state-owned sector has enjoyed large, positive wage rents, 
and that these rents have changed little from 1990 to 2000.   
As for the industry wage rents, we calculate the effect of changes in ownership 
wage rents on the relative wage of different education groups, and decompose it into 
wage effects and weight effects.  Results are reported in columns 5 to 7 of Table 5. 
They show that changes in ownership wage rents were positive but very small from 1990 
to 1995. Interestingly, wage effects were positive, indicating a growing wage premium 
from being employed in the state sector, but weight effects were actually negative as more 
educated workers left the state-owned sector (see Table 4). From 1995 to 2000, however, 
the wage effect became negative, indicating that wage differentials associated with 
ownership types shrank. The weight effect remained negative for the wage of senior high 
relative to junior high and below, but turned positive for the wage of college relative to 
senior high school graduates.  The latter result suggests that college-educated workers 
returned to the state-sector or were less likely to leave or be let go during the process of 
state-sector restructuring that occurred during the late 1990s.   
 
5.2. Labor supply   
A natural index for capturing the changes in relative labor supply of different 
education groups is the labor-supply-shift index, SUPi, the proportionate change in   17
group i’s share of aggregate labor force, measured as the change in the logarithm of the 
shares: 
  ) (ln
s





i N N /     is the fraction of education group i in the total labor force.   
The educational composition of the labor force from the UHS data is reported in 
columns 1 to 3 of Table 7. One major limitation of the UHS data is that the surveys 
sample only registered urban residents, excluding migrants who lack permanent resident 
status even though migrants increasingly compete with local residents in urban labor 
markets. Using 1990 and 2000 census data and 1995 mini-census data from the same 
provinces, which do include migrants, we recalculate the relative shares of urban labor in 
different education groups as well as the fraction of migrants in the labor force for the 
years 1990, 1995, and 2000. As reported in Table 6, the estimated fraction of migrants in 
the urban labor force was 7.83% in 1990, 15.75% in 1995 and 33.19% in 2000.
11 The 
composition of migrants by education level is reported in columns 4 to 6 of Table 7. 
The labor supply composition by education group after including migrants are reported 
in columns 7 to 9 of Table 7. Then the change in the relative supply of each group i 
(SUPi) is calculated using equation (8) and the results are reported in column 1 of Table 
9. 
As seen in Table 7, if we consider only local permanent residents, the rise in 
educational attainment has been very rapid. However, if we include migrants, the rise is 
much less dramatic. From 1995 to 2000, the decline in the share of junior high school 
graduates among local urban residents is almost completely offset by the inflow of 
migrants with junior high school education or lower. The SUP index, reported in Table 9, 
                                                        
11  We assume that migrants and local residents with the same level of educational attainment are perfect 
substitutes. To the extent that the two are not substitutes, we may underestimate changes in the relative 
supply of skilled labor (since local residents show a sharper increase in educational attainment), and so 
underestimate the negative impact of changes in relative supply on the returns to education.   18
reveals that from 1990 to 1995, the relative supply of senior high school to junior school 
graduates and that of the college to senior high school graduates went up by 14.5 percent 
and 30 percent, respectively. However, from 1995 to 2000, the situation changed 
dramatically due to the surge of migration, which led to a decline of 13.5 percent in the 
relative supply of senior high school graduates to junior high school graduates or below.   
Over the same period, the supply of the college educated relative to senior high school 
graduates increased by 12.6 percent. 
 
5.3. Shifts in Product Demand 
Changes in the structure of output lead to changes in the structure of inputs, in 
particular the skill composition of labor demand. Under the assumptions that relative 
labor productivity across industries remains constant and the labor market clears in each 
period, changes in the employment distribution across industries must reflect shifts in the 
structure of product demand. Following Freeman (1975) and Katz and Murphy (1992), 
we use the average employment growth by industry weighted by the initial employment 
share of each educational group to define an index EMPi to measure the effect of 
product demand shifts on relative labor demand:   
    
j ij j i EMP   ) (ln . (9) 
Here,  j  is the share of employment in industry j and  ) (ln j    is the proportionate 
change in the employment share in industry j. 
    Table 8 describes the changes in the structure of industries over time. The 
distribution of employment across industries,  j  , computed from the UHS data which 
includes only local permanent residents is reported in columns 1 to 3. As before, we 
adjust the industrial employment shares using the share of migrants and their distribution 
across industries according to the census data in 1990 and 2000. The migrant shares of   19
the urban work force are presented in Table 6, the employment distribution of migrants 
across industries are described in columns 4 to 6 of Table 8, and the adjusted 
employment distributions of all urban workers are reported in columns 7 to 9. The 
change in industrial employment shares ( ) (ln j   ) are in columns 10 and 11.   
Industries such as education and media, and semi-government organizations, which 
employ college-educated workers more intensively experienced a relative contraction, 
especially from 1995 to 2000. The index EMPi, the values of which are reported in 
column 2 of Table 9, can be taken as a proxy for the change in the structure of labor 
demand, d(lnDi). The values of this index are positive but close to zero for 1990-1995 
and negative and large (-0.075 and -0.101) for 1995-2000, suggesting that shifts in 
product demand increased the relative demand for unskilled workers in the later period. 
However, changes in relative employment growth rates among industries also could be 
caused by changes in labor supply structure, which would lead to bias in the 
decomposition of relative wage changes.   
An alternative approach that can avoid this bias is to estimate a discrete version of 
product-demand-shift index, DEMi: 
      
j
j ij i i x D DEM ) (ln ) (ln   (10) 
where  xj is the true relative demand for products produced by industry-j based on 
consumer preferences (Bound and Johnson, 1992). Unfortunately, these xj are 
unobserved.  However, the unknown  ) (ln j x  can be estimated as coefficients dlnxj in 
the following equation: 
  ))] / (ln( )[ 1 ( ) (ln ) (ln ) 1 ( ) (ln i ij
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    , (11) 
where the subscript i indexes educational groups (i=1, 2, 3), j indexes industries, bij  is  an 
index of the technical efficiency of group i in industry j; bi is the average technical   20
efficiency of group i across all industries; and d(lnbij/lnbi) is the deviation of the growth 
rate of technical efficiency of group i in industry j from the average growth rate of 
technical efficiency for group i. If we assume that technical changes are the same across 
industries for all the groups, the mean of d(lnbij/lnbi) will equal to 0, and the last term in 
equation (11) can be treated as a random error with mean zero. Under this assumption, 
which we justify below, we can obtain unbiased estimates for dlnxj by estimating equation 
(11) using OLS. 
The results of this estimation are presented in columns 12 and 13 of Table 8. Based 
on these estimates for  ) (ln j x  , the product-demand-shift indices DEMi’s are calculated 
using equation (10) and reported in column 3 of Table 9. All of the values for DEM are 
negative, providing evidence that changes in product demand across industries caused 
the relative demand for unskilled labor to increase. This shift is consistent with the 
expansion of international trade.  Since China has a more abundant supply of 
less-educated workers, comparative advantage dictates that China should specialize in 
producing goods that use low-skilled labor more intensively. This structural transition in 
China is aided by the rise of market-driven and export-oriented foreign-invested and 
private enterprises, which faced market-determined wages and lacked access to 
subsidized credit, leading to employment decisions more in line with China’s comparative 
advantage.  
 
5.4. Skill-Biased Technical Change   
Generally speaking, technological progress can occur in a particular industry or in all 
industries; thus, skill-biased technical changes that affect the relative demand for workers 
with different skill levels can be industry-specific or general. In the estimation 
of ) (ln j x   above, we treated the effect of industry-specific technical change (the last   21
term in equation (11)) as a random error. If this assumption about the error term does 
not hold, the estimation of dlnxj could be biased because faster technological progress in 
some industries could cause a larger increase in the demand for labor in those industries. 
In the U.S., it has been suggested that the effects of spurts of innovation on the relative 
demand for different groups could vary across industries (Bound and Johnson, 1992). 
To test whether technical change actually varies across industries, we follow Bound 
and Johnson (1992) and decompose the growth rate of technology efficiency of group i 
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Here J’ is the subset of industries hypothesized to have a different rate of growth 
than a comparison set of industries, ci0   is the average growth rate in technical efficiency 
of group i in the comparison industries, and ci1 is the difference between the growth rate 
of technical efficiency in the two groups . If there is no significant influence of 
industry-specific technical efficiency change, then the average growth rate of technology 
efficiency for the two groups should be the same, equal to ci0.  
The average growth rate of technology efficiency for group i can thus be expressed 
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ij iJ   is the proportion of education group i’s employment in the subset 
of industries J’. The industry-specific technical efficiency change of group i in industry j 
is: 
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where DJ’ is a vector of dummy variables for whether each industry is part of J’. 
Substituting equation (14) into equation (11), we get: 
  ) ( ) 1 ( ) (ln ) (ln ) 1 ( ) (ln ' ' 1 iJ J i
j k
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 (11’) 
By choosing a specific industry set J’ and one or more educational groups, we can 
estimate this equation using OLS, and estimate values for  1 ) 1 ( i c   . If those values are 
not significantly different from zero, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are 
no industry-specific technical changes.
12  
We test a wide range of industries and educational groups in this way. For example, 
we first test whether the manufacturing industry enjoyed a rate of technological change 
that was different than other industries. We find that there are no educational groups for 
which this is the case. The p-value for the joint exclusion test that none of the three 
educational groups exhibits a different rate of technological change in manufacturing is 
0.567 for the period 1990 to 1995 and 0.339 for the period 1995 to 2000. Similarly, we 
tried other industries such as construction; transportation, post, and telecom services; 
wholesale and retail trade & catering services; public utility management and social 
services, both individually and jointly. All the results fail to show that there is any 
significant industry-specific technology effect for any educational group.   
We take this as evidence that all three educational groups have the same growth 
rate of technological efficiency across industries. One possible explanation for the lack 
of industry-specific technical change is that economic reforms and institutional changes 
in the 1990s promoted efficiency similarly in all sectors of the economy rather than in 
specific industries. Another possibility is that our classification of industries is too broad 
to capture industry-specific technical change well. Given these findings, we conclude that 
                                                        
12 Given  σ>1, the term (σ -1)ci1 should be different from zero if group i has different growth rate of 
technological efficiency (namely, ci1≠0). Theoretically, it is also possible that σ =1, however, the likelihood 
that this equality holds exactly is vanishingly small.   23
the previous estimates of d(lnxj) are unbiased when estimating equation (11’) using OLS. 
Given the lack of evidence of industry-specific technical change, we focus 
attention exclusively on estimating the contribution of general technical change, captured 
by the term  ) (ln ) / 1 1 ( i b d   . The difficulty, of course, is that bi is unobservable. 
However, the effect of general technical change on the relative wage of an educational 
group can be approximated by the difference between the change in competitive wage 
dwic and the effects of changes in relative supply and relative demand (see equation (5)).   
As seen in equation (5), estimating the impact of relative demand and relative 
supply on relative wages requires an estimate of the elasticity of substitution   ˆ . One 
approach is to estimate this parameter directly from the data.
13 We adopt a strategy 
similar to that of Katz and Murphy (1992), estimating the following time series 
regression: 
                t D t t N t N t W t W i i i i 1 3 2 1 1 0 1 )] ( / ) ( ln[ )] ( / ) ( ln[ . (15) 
Here i refers to senior high school (college), and i-1 refers to junior high school and 
below (senior high school);  )] ( / ) ( ln[ 1 t W t W i i   is the relative wage of educational group 
i compared to education group i-1 in year t;  )] ( / ) ( ln[ 1 t N t N i i   is the relative supply of 
educational group i compared to education group i-1 in year t; D1 is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the comparison group is senior vs. junior high school, and 0 if 
otherwise;    / 1 1   , and  1 3 2 D     captures relative changes over time in the 
demand for each comparison group
14. The estimate for elasticity of intrafactor 
                                                        
13  Bound and Johnson (1992) estimate a second-differenced equation for the market wage. Because of our 
focus on three skill groups (college educated and above, senior high school, and junior high school and 
below), there are only 3 observations and there is no way of running regressions.   
14  Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate the elasticity of the substitution between college and senior high 
school by running the following linear regression on time series data: 
        t t N t N t w t w 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 )] ( / ) ( ln[ )] ( / ) ( ln[ , where w2(t)/w1(t), N2(t)/N1(t) are the relative wage of college and 
high school graduates and the relative supply of college to high school labor; α1= -1/σ, and α2 captures the 
time trend of relative demand shifts. This regression specification is based on a simple CES technology 
with two factors (college and high school labor) with changes in relative demand for college versus high 
school labor being a simple linear time trend.     24
substitution   ˆ   can be simply computed from the estimated coefficient    / ˆ 1 ˆ1  .  
For our sample, time t ranges from 1989 to 2001. The OLS estimates for 
equation (15) are the following:   
861 . 0    , 26              
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The results yield an estimate for the elasticity of intra-factor substitution of 2.11, which 
appears to be on the high side in comparison to studies of the U.S. In the decomposition 
section, we use this estimate but also test the sensitivity of results to different 
assumptions about the elasticity of intra-factor substitution, given the large potential for 
error in estimation of this type of time-series specification.   
 
5.5. Decomposition Results 
Using the estimates from previous sections, we can fully decompose the sources of 
changes in the returns to education in urban China during the 1990s into four 
components: changes in wage rents (including industry wage rents and ownership wage 
rents), changes in relative labor supply, changes in relative demand resulting from 
changes in production structure, and general technical change. The latter is computed 
from the residual relative wage changes not explained by relative demand and supply 
changes, as well as our estimate of the elasticity of substitution among different 
education groups. 
In Table 10, decomposition results are reported separately for the early and late 
1990s, and for changes in the relative wages of college versus high school graduates and 
of high school graduates versus those completing junior high school and below. The 
results yield a number of interesting findings. First, changes in relative technical change 
are by far the most important source of rising returns to skill in all time periods and   25
regardless of which education groups are being compared, accounting for between 58 
and 287 percent of relative wage increases. Bound and Johnson (1992) also found general 
technical change to be by far the most important contributing factor to rising returns to 
college education in the 1980s. However, because the effects of technical change are 
calculated as residual effects, one must interpret this result carefully. Although skill-biased 
technical change is likely to be an important part of the story, as evidenced by rapid 
improvements in technology in China brought about at least partly by inward foreign 
direct investment, other factors are at play as well. Perhaps most importantly, the 
institutional transition towards a market economy may have caused wages to increasingly 
reflect differences in the productivity of workers and also provided incentives for more 
educated workers to become more productive (Zhang et al., 2005).   
Second, for three of the four decompositions, changes in wage rents are the second 
most important contributor to relative wage increases, accounting for 32 percent of 
increasing relative wages of high school graduates versus those with less than high school 
education in the early 1990s and 27 and 38 percent of increasing relative wages of 
college versus high school graduates in the early and late 1990s. These contributions of 
wage rents to rising wage differentials reflects growing specialization of more educated 
workers in higher rent sectors relative to less educated workers. These contributions are 
greater in the late 1990s, when rural-urban migration accelerated. 
Third, changes in relative labor supply and relative labor demand associated with 
shifts in production structure generally reduced the relative wages of better educated 
workers. The only exception is the change in relative supply of high school graduates 
versus those without high school degrees from 1995 to 2000, when China witnessed a 
large-scale migration of poorly educated rural workers to the cities.    During this period, 
the falling relative supply of high school graduates accounted for 54.4 percent of rising 
relative wages of high school graduates compared to those without high school degrees.   26
For all other periods and education group comparisons, the relative supply of better 
educated workers increased. The negative effects of these increases were much greater 
than the negative effects due to shifts in product demand. As a share of relative wage 
increases of college versus high school graduates, relative supply changes contributed 
-190 and -57.6 percent in the early and late 1990s, compared to -24.1 and -30.2 percent 
contributions from changes in relative demand associated with changing production 
structure. In the early 1990s, relative supply changes reduced the relative wage of high 
school graduates versus those without high school degrees by 85 percent, compared to a 
4.7 percent reduction due to changes in relative demand. As noted earlier, the negative 
contribution of demand changes to rising returns to education is consistent with 
expanding international trade.    This negative effect appears to have been even greater in 
the late 1990s than the early 1990s, perhaps due to significant trade liberalization and 
growing trade in the late 1990s as China prepared for WTO accession. 
Our final exercise is to examine the sensitivity of our results to the magnitude of 
the elasticity of substitution of workers from different education groups. As noted earlier, 
our estimated value of 2.11 is on the high side of estimates for the U.S. (Freeman, 1986), 
even though many recent studies generally accept that the elasticity of substitution 
between high-skill and low-skill workers is greater than one in the U.S. (Katz and Murphy, 
1992; Bound and Johnson,1992; Autor, Katz, and Kruger, 1998; Katz, and Autor, 1999). 
In China, one might expect an even lower elasticity of substitution given remaining 
rigidities in the labor market associated with regulated wage and employment policies in 
the state sector and policy barriers to spatial mobility.  On the other hand, China has a 
very high literacy rate and production sophistication may be relatively low compared to 
developed countries, reducing the set of tasks that can only be completed by better 
educated workers. 
In Table 11, we report decomposition results varying the elasticity of substitution   27
from 1.1 to 3.    The first thing to note is that the contribution of wage rents is invariant 
to assumptions about the elasticity of substitution.    Second, increases in the elasticity of 
substitution increase the contributions of relative supply and demand changes 
multiplicatively, with the contribution of general technical change adjusting to ensure that 
the total changes add up to actual changes in relative wages. In our case, as the elasticity 
of substitution increases, the negative effects of relative supply and demand changes 
both become smaller (less negative) and the estimated positive contribution of technical 
change falls as well but by proportionately less than the reduced negative effects. As an 
example, comparing the case of σ=1.1 with the baseline estimates reported in Table 10, 
the negative contribution of relative supply changes to the relative wage increase of high 
school graduates versus those without high school degrees from 1990 to 1995 falls in 
magnitude from -163 percent to -60 percent, the contribution of relative demand 
changes falls from -9 percent to -3 percent, and the contribution of technical change falls 
from 240 to 131 percent.  Even at the lowest elasticity of substitution, the positive 
impact of general technical change on relative wages outweighs the negative effects of 
changes in relative supply and relative demand.  Thus, the main conclusions of the 




In this paper, we analyze the extent to which recent rapid increases in the returns 
to education can be explained by four factors: changes in industrial wage rents, changes 
in relative labor supply, shifts in product demand due to international trade, and the 
changes in relative technical efficiency.  We find that skill-biased technical progress 
accounts for most of the rise in returns to education, which we interpret broadly to 
include changes in available technologies (including those transferred through FDI and   28
imports) as well as institutional changes associated with economic transition and 
maturation of China’s urban labor market. Changes in industrial wage rents are the 
second most important contributing factor, while changes in ownership wage rents 
contribute only slightly to rising wage premiums for education. The relative supply of 
highly educated groups increased over time, reducing education premiums, except for a 
reduction in the relative supply of high school graduates compared to those completing 
junior high school and below in the late 1990s when rural migration increased 
significantly. Finally, shifts in production structure also mitigated growth in the premium 
to education premium, consistent with international trade favoring production of less 
skill-intensive products, but this effect was less important than relative supply increases.   
We consider three skill groups: junior high school and below, senior high school, 
and college and above. In both periods, the growth in the returns to high school 
compared to junior high and below outpaced growth in the returns to higher education 
compared to high school. This was due to faster expansion of higher education which 
increased the relative supply of college graduates combined with greater increases in 
migration of rural workers with lower levels of education to urban areas, as well as shifts 
in product demand towards low skill-intensive products, which reduced the relative 
demand for college graduates. 
Another distinctive pattern is that increases in the relative wage of high school 
graduates compared to those not graduating from high school was much faster during 
1995-2000 than during 1990-1995. The most important reason for this acceleration was 
the slowdown in the growth of relative supply of senior versus junior school graduates, 
again caused by the larger increase in migration in the late 1990s and the greater 
likelihood that senior high school graduates would go on to college. 
One important limitation of the data used in this study is that it only permits 
industry classifications that are highly aggregated. This may lead to downward bias in the   29
estimated effects of changes in industrial wage rents and of shifts in product demand 
due to international trade, and upward bias in the effect of general technical change. 
Our study contribute to understanding the motivating puzzle that although trade 
theory predicts a decline in the relative demand for skilled workers in developing 
countries, many countries in the developing world experienced rising wage premiums for 
skilled workers during the recent period of rapid globalization. Our results show that 
shifts in production structure did indeed reduce the demand for skilled workers in China, 
technological change and institutional reforms favoring skilled workers were powerful 
enough to more than offset this effect. Consistent with the existing literature, the 
magnitude of the effect of international trade is found to be relatively small. Because 
many new technologies favoring skilled workers could have been transferred through 
foreign direct investment or imports, and because competition from foreign-invested 
enterprises played a key role in institutional reforms that liberalized wage setting, on 
balance, globalization likely played a positive role in increasing skill premiums in urban 
China.   30
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workers  Self-employed Retired-workers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1989 6006  5721  66  71 
1990 6573  6249  72  93 
1991 6574  6239  79  82 
1992 8350  7936  84  153 
1993 7472  7083  91  116 
1994 7267  6831  87  160 
1995 7353  6930  96  129 
1996 7219  6759  100  162 
1997 7373  6841  148  162 
1998 7146  6519  173  155 
1999 7037  6314  198  201 
2000 7350  6444  254  199 
2001 6618  5612  271  211 
Note: (i) To focus on the labor market in urban area, farmers are excluded from all the samples 




Table 2. Mean Log Wages by Education Group, 1990, 1995 and 2000 (1988 yuan) 
   1990 1995 2000 
  Junior high school and below    7.40 7.70    7.85 
 Senior  high  school  7.43 7.88    8.22 
  College and above  7.64 8.16    8.48 
 
 
Table 3. Wage Differentials and Changes in Relative Wage, 1990, 1995, 2000 
   Wage  Differentials  Changes 
   1990  1995  2000  1990-1995 1995-2000 
  Senior high vs. junior high and below  0.149  0.229  0.347   0.081   0.118  
  College and above vs. senior high  0.177  0.252  0.356   0.075   0.104  
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Table 4. Wage Rents and Employment Distribution by Industry and Ownership 
  Wage rent  Employment distribution(%) 
    Junior high and below  Senior high  College and above 
  1990  1995  2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
A. Industry               
Manufacturing  -0.002  -0.047  -0.075  50.81 49.51 44.53    37.88 35.06 35.21 28.62 27.14 23.91 
Construction  0.075  0.078  -0.024  3.67 5.00 4.44    2.22 3.97 3.58 1.54 3.01 4.17 
Transportation, post and telecom services  0.075  0.122  0.130  8.73 7.09 8.75    6.52 6.90 7.95 3.51 3.54 4.49 
Wholesale/retail trade & catering services  -0.022  -0.098  -0.116  18.55 19.06 18.53    15.13 17.16 17.42  6.18  8.41  9.11 
Public utility management and social services  -0.009  0.092  -0.029  4.69 6.22  10.46    3.87 4.94 9.39 1.34 2.84 5.47 
Health care, sports and social selfare  0.038  0.078  0.166  1.96 1.96 2.04    6.61 6.35 5.23 7.52 6.82 5.94 
Education, research, culture and mass media,  -0.012  0.046  0.148  2.95  3.34  2.96    10.41  9.06  7.07 26.97 20.33 17.27 
Finance and insurance  0.076  0.244  0.185  0.54 0.47 0.78    2.51 3.74 3.11 2.22 3.16 6.40 
Government agencies and social organizations  -0.021  0.059  0.118  4.88  5.19  4.00    12.46 11.32  8.23 19.97 23.02 21.28 
Geological exploration and other industries  -0.106  -0.163  -0.135  3.22 2.15 3.52    2.37 1.50 2.80 2.14 1.74 1.95 
B .   O w n e r s h i p                    
Non-SOEs  -0.119 -0.136 -0.117 34.22 36.78 46.48    17.76 22.10 32.43 5.05   10.64 18.51 
Government and SOEs  0.034  0.040  0.046 65.78 63.22 53.52    82.24 77.90 67.57 94.95 89.36 81.49   35
Table 5. Changes in Relative Wage and Wage Rents, 1990 to 1995 and 1995 to 2000 















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1990-1995           
Senior vs. junior  0.081 0.023 0.003 0.025 0.004  -0.003    0.001    0.026 
College vs. senior  0.075 0.023  -0.003 0.020 0.003  -0.002    0.001    0.020 
1995-2000          
Senior vs. junior  0.118 0.018  -0.014 0.004  -0.002  -0.001    -0.003    0.001 
College vs. senior  0.104 0.026 0.011 0.037  -0.002 0.004    0.002    0.040 
Note: “Senior-junior” denotes senior high school vs. junior high school and below, and 
“College-senior” denotes college and above vs. senior high school. 
 
 
Table 6. Share of Migrants in the Labor Force and Employment in Urban Areas in 6 Provinces   
 1990  1995
* 2000 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Residents  4.81   8.48   16.56  
Labor force  7.83   15.75   33.19  
Employment  8.00   16.56   35.40  
Note: * The fraction of migrants among residents in 1995 is computed directly by the statistics 
that are summarized by NBS from the 1 percent population survey in 1995. The fractions of 
migrants among labor force and employment in 1995 are figured out by the pattern of the change 
in fractions of migrant among residents. Under the assumption that in urban area, the fractions of 
migrants in labor force and employment changed by the same paces as that of migrants in 
residents during 1990-2000, the fractions of migrants in 1995 can be  figured out by the 
following equation: 
Fmig1995=Fmig1990+(Fmig2000-Fmig1990)*(Fpop1995-Fpop1990)/(Fpop2000-Fpop1990), 
where Fmig1990, Fmig1995 and Fmig2000 respectively stand for the fraction of migrants among 
labor force and employment in 1990,1995 and 2000; similarly, Fpop1990, Fpop1995 and 




Table 7. Educational Composition of Labor Force in Urban China 
 Local  residents  Migrants  All 
  1990 1995 2000 1990 1995
* 2000 1990 1995 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Junior high and below  48.37   38.41  31.99  82.41  82.02  79.07  51.03  45.28  47.62 
Senior high  38.28   41.52  43.00  15.80  15.90  17.16  36.52  37.48  34.43 
College and above  13.35   20.07  25.00  1.79  2.15  3.77  12.44  17.24  17.96 
Note: The educational composition of migrants in 1995 is figured out by that of all residents in 
1995, according to the statistics on the educational distribution of all residents in 1995, which are 
summarized by NBS from 1 percent population survey in 1995, and assuming that the changes in 
educational distribution of migrants have the same pace as that of all residents. 
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Table 8. Adjusted Relative Labor Supply and Derived Demand Indexes by Industry, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000 
  Local Urban 
 Resident Workers  Migrant Workers  Employed in urban area  ) (ln j     ) (ln j x   








  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Manufacturing  42.87  38.92  35.17  48.42  50.39  63.47    43.32  40.82  45.19  -0.059 0.102  -0.042  -0.053   
Construction  2.83  4.17  4.00  17.24  14.96  7.39    3.98  5.95  5.20  0.402 -0.135  0.421 -0.034   
Transportation, post and telecom. services  7.18  6.28  7.30  4.39  2.82  2.36    6.96  5.71  5.55  -0.198 -0.028 -0.099  0.197   
Wholesale/retail trade & catering services  15.56  16.08  15.60  16.52  17.16  17.66    15.64  16.26  16.33  0.039 0.004 0.083 0.019   
Public utility management and social services  3.92  4.99  8.70  5.97  6.18  6.54    4.09  5.19  7.94  0.239 0.425 0.294 0.602   
Health care, sports and social welfare  4.48  4.78  4.42  0.92  0.72  0.51    4.20  4.11  3.04  -0.022 -0.302 -0.046 -0.145   
Education, research, culture and mass media  9.06  9.20  8.45  4.29  6.27  1.22    8.68  8.72  5.89  0.004 -0.392 -0.161 -0.206   
Finance and insurance  1.52  2.38  3.24  0.11  0.17  0.21    1.41  2.01  2.17  0.360 0.074 0.297 0.106   
Government agencies and social organizations  9.82  11.39  10.32  1.88  1.20  0.52    9.18  9.70  6.85  0.055 -0.348  0.006 -0.219   
Geological exploration and other industries  2.75  1.80  2.81  0.26  0.21  0.12    2.55  1.53  1.86  -0.508 0.190  -0.397 0.474   
Total  100 100 100 100  100 100  100  100  100  -  -  -  - 
Note: The industrial distribution of migrants in 1995 is figured out by the statistics on the industrial distribution of all workers, which are summarized by NBS 
from 1 percent population survey in 1995, and assuming that the changes of migrants in industrial distribution from 1990 to 2000 have the same paces as that of 
all residents. 
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Table 9. Changes in Relative Supply and Relative Labor Demand Due to Shifts in Product 
Demand across Industries 
Years and education groups  SUP  EMP    DEM 
  (1) (2) (3) 
1990-1995     
Senior high vs. junior high and below  0.145 0.018    -0.008 
College and above vs. senior high  0.300 0.004    -0.038 
1995-2000     
Senior high vs. junior high and below  -0.135  -0.075    -0.032 
College and above vs. senior high  0.126  -0.101    -0.066 
 
 
Table 10. Decomposition of Change in Relative Wages, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000 
  ΔRel.  Δ Wage rents  SUP  DEM  ΔTech 
 wage  All  Industry  Owner.       
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Change in relative wage             
1990-1995         
Senior-junior   0.081  0.026  0.025  0.001  -0.069   -0.004   0.128  
College-senior   0.075  0.02  0.02  0.001  -0.143   -0.018   0.216  
1995-2000         
Senior-junior   0.118  0.001  0.004  -0.003  0.064   -0.015   0.068  
College-senior   0.104  0.04  0.037  0.002  -0.060   -0.031   0.155  
B. Percentage of change in relative wage 
1990-1995         
Senior-junior   100  32.10    30.86    1.23    -85.04    -4.69    157.63 
College-senior   100  26.67    26.67    1.33    -190.02  -24.07    287.43 
1995-2000         
Senior-junior   100  0.85    3.39    -2.54    54.35    -12.88    57.69   
College-senior   100  38.46    35.58    1.92    -57.56    -30.15    149.24 
Note: “Senior-junior” denotes senior high school vs. junior high school and below, and 
“College-senior” denotes college and above vs. senior high school. 
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Table 11. Sensitivity of Decomposition Results to the Elasticity of Substitution (% of Change in 
Relative Wage) 













 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
=1.1     
1990-1995  Senior-  junior  100  32.10   -162.74  -8.98   239.62  
  College-  senior  100  26.67   -363.64  -46.06   483.03  
1995-2000  Senior-  junior  100  0.85   104.01   -24.65   19.80  
  College-  senior  100  38.46   -110.14   -57.69   229.37  
=1.5          
1990-1995  Senior-  junior  100  32.10   -119.34   -6.58   193.83  
  College-  senior  100  26.67   -266.67  -33.78   373.78  
1995-2000  Senior-  junior  100  0.85   76.27   -18.08   40.96  
  College-  senior  100  38.46   -80.77   -42.31   184.62  
=2          
1990-1995  Senior-  junior  100  32.10   -89.51   -4.94   162.35  
  College-  senior  100  26.67   -200.00  -25.33   298.67  
1995-2000  Senior-  junior  100  0.85   57.20   -13.56   55.51  
  College-  senior  100  38.46   -60.58   -31.73   153.85  
=2.5          
1990-1995  Senior-  junior  100  32.10   -71.60   -3.95   143.46  
  College-  senior  100  26.67   -160.00  -20.27   253.60  
1995-2000  Senior-  junior  100  0.85   45.76   -10.85   64.24  
  College-  senior  100  38.46   -48.46   -25.38   135.38  
=3          
1990-1995  Senior-  junior  100  32.10   -59.67   -3.29   130.86  
  College-  senior  100  26.67   -133.33  -16.89   223.56  
1995-2000  Senior-  junior  100  0.85   38.14   -9.04   70.06  
  College-  senior  100  38.46   -40.38   -21.15   123.08  
Note: “Senior-junior” denotes senior high school vs. junior high school and below, and 
“College-senior” denotes college and above vs. senior high school. 




Table A1. Comparison of Labor Force Samples from UHS and Census 
Variables 
UHS- labor force 
in Six provinces 
Census-local labor force 
Six provinces  Country 
1990 1995 2000 1990 2000  1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age (years)  37.41  38.31  39.50  33.67  35.55   33.39   35.15 
Male (%)  51.60  51.50  52.02  56.36  56.92   57.75   58.34 
Average Years of Schooling:  10.76  11.19  11.57  9.85  10.28    9.84   10.43 
Education distribution (%):         
Junior high and below  48.37  38.41  31.99  60.41  55.88   59.82   53.26 
Senior high  38.28  41.52  43.00  29.67  28.52   31.33   31.04 
College and above  13.35  20.07  25.00  9.92  15.60    8.85   15.70 
Employment distribution:         
A. Across Industries(%):         
Manufacturing  42.87  38.92  35.17  51.02  38.99   51.10   39.37 
Construction  2.83  4.17  4.00  7.15  6.85    6.50    6.81 
Transportation, post and telecom. services  7.18  6.28  7.30  6.61  7.46    7.91    7.89 
Wholesale/retail trade & catering services  15.56  16.08  15.60  12.19  18.57   12.20   17.21 
Public utility management and social services  3.92  4.99  8.70  4.51  8.15    3.85    7.29 
Health care, sports and social welfare  4.48  4.78  4.42  2.91  3.09    2.64    3.22 
Education, research, culture and mass media  9.06  9.20  8.45  8.84  7.74    7.89    7.95 
Finance and insurance  1.52  2.38  3.24  0.98  2.16    1.11    2.06 
Government agencies and social organizations  9.82  11.39  10.32  5.67  6.19    6.21    6.98 
Geological exploration and other industries  2.75  1.80  2.81  0.12  0.82    0.58    1.21 
B. Across Ownerships(%):          
Non-SOEs  25.91  27.51  37.49  -  -  -  - 
Government and SOEs  74.09  72.49  62.51  -  -  -  - 
Note: For the sample from census, the ownership of the work units did not be reported by the 
employed. 
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Table A2. Changes in Education Composition of Labor Force 
Composition 
UHS-labor force 
in six provinces 
Census-local labor force 
Six provinces  Country 
1990 1995 2000 1990 2000  1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
A. Junior high and below(%):            
Illiterate  1.05  0.54  0.22  2.67  1.66    3.27    1.52 
Primary School  19.16  14.44  11.98  26.45  23.70    24.53   18.43 
Junior High School  79.79  85.02  87.80  70.88  74.64    72.20   78.04 
B. Senior high(%):          
Senior High School  68.94  68.48  70.27  76.97  71.34    76.43   69.62 
Middle Technique School  31.06  31.52  29.73  23.03  28.66    23.58   33.86 
C. College and above(%):          
3- or 2-year-college  -  67.52  70.75  55.54  64.65    60.42   69.32 
University and above  -  32.48  29.25  44.46  35.35    39.58   32.20 
Note: For the 1990 sample from UHS, the composition of the College-and-above group can not be 
identified, because the sub-categories were not designed into the questionnaire in 1990. 
 
 
 